

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
TEXARKANA DIVISION

CHARLES DAVID BROOKS	§	
VS.	§	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-153
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID	§	

MEMORANDUM ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING  
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Charles David Brooks, an inmate formerly confined at the Telford Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis*, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Court referred this matter to the Honorable Caroline Craven, United States Magistrate Judge, at Texarkana, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this Court. The Magistrate Judge recommends this petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

The Court has received and considered the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge filed pursuant to such order, along with the record, and pleadings. Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge. This requires a *de novo* review of the objections in relation to the pleadings and applicable law. *See* FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).

After careful consideration, the Court finds petitioner’s objections are without merit. As stated by the Magistrate Judge, “prison disciplinary proceedings are overturned only where no evidence in the record supports the decision.” *Broussard v. Johnson*, 253 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2001). “Determining the believability of the testimonies presented at the hearing is left to the discretion of the hearing officer.” *Hudson v. Johnson*, 252 F.3d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 2001). The information provided in a written incident report standing alone can satisfy the “some evidence” standard. *Id.* At 536-37. Here, the disciplinary charge is supported by some evidence. The

Disciplinary Hearing Officer relied on the charging officer's report and the charging officer's testimony during the hearing. Federal Courts will not review a disciplinary hearing officer's factual findings *de novo*, instead the courts will only consider whether the decision is supported by "some facts" or by "a modicum of evidence." *Superintendent v. Hill*, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).

Finally, a demotion in time-earning classification does not implicate due process concerns. "[T]he mere opportunity to earn good-time credits [does not] constitute a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause." *Luken v. Scott*, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995). "An inmate has neither a protectible property nor liberty interest in his custody classification. . . ." *Moody v. Baker*, 857 F.2d 256, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 488 U.S. 985, 109 S.Ct. 540, 102 L.Ed.2d 570 (1988).

#### ORDER

Accordingly, petitioner's objections are **OVERRULED**. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Magistrate Judge are correct and the report of the Magistrate Judge is **ADOPTED**. A final judgment will be entered in this case in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's recommendations.

Furthermore, the Court is of the opinion petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. An appeal from a judgment denying post-conviction collateral relief may not proceed unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The standard for a certificate of appealability requires the petitioner to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. *See Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000); *Elizalde v. Dretke*, 362 F.3d 323, 328 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner need not establish that he would prevail on the merits. Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are subject to debate among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions presented are worthy of encouragement to proceed further. *See Slack*, 529 U.S. at 483-84. Any doubt regarding whether to grant a certificate of

appealability should be resolved in favor of the petitioner, and the severity of the penalty may be considered in making this determination. *See Miller v. Johnson*, 200 F.3d 274, 280-81 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *cert. denied*, 531 U.S. 849 (2000).

In this case, petitioner has not shown that any of the issues would be subject to debate among jurists of reason. The questions presented are not worthy of encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to make a sufficient showing to merit the issuance of certificate of appealability. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability will not be issued.

**It is SO ORDERED.**

**SIGNED this 15th day of July, 2014.**

  
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MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE